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ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS. By Sotirios 
Barber.1 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1984. 
Pp. viii, 245. 
Stanley C Brubaker2 
Of the recent books developing general theories of the Con-
stitution or the role of the courts in constitutional adjudication, 
this work is the most ambitious.3 Before considering the legiti-
macy of "noninterpretive" judicial review or the tension between 
judicial review and democracy-the questions that have absorbed 
most constitutional commentators-we must ask the question 
posed by Barber, "What does the Constitution mean?'' In explor-
ing this qustion, Barber takes the perspective of an ideal citizen. 
He thus avoids the typical lawyer's confusion of constitutional law 
with the Constitution itself, as well as the typical social scientist's 
conceit that we can know all the constitutional facts but nothing 
about constitutional values. In this work, Barber takes constitu-
tional interpretation to uncharted depths of meaning where it 
must penetrate some of the toughest and most enduring questions 
of political authority. That Barber's reach should exceed his grasp 
can hardly be surprising, but the flaws of his argument appear 
deep, stemming both from the basic logic of this argument and the 
fabric from which he fashions the Constitution's meaning and 
authority. 
I 
Barber's argument is sufficiently complex that it must be out-
lined in some detail. The first two chapters rebut the objection 
that the Constitution has no meaning (dealing with the contention 
that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, and the 
"realist" claim that the disposition of the justices, not the Consti-
tution itself, determines what the Court says).4 Professor Barber 
then begins the construction of his argument in chapter three. Its 
keystone is an account of article VI, where the Constitution pro-
I. Visiting Professor of Political Science, Princeton, University. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. 
3. S. BARBER ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984). 
4. /d. at 5, 16. 
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claims itself the "supreme law of the land." "Meaning" for Bar-
ber is primarily a matter of "making sense,"5 and making sense 
requires conforming to the structure of reason and to fundamental 
concepts. Thus, since law is in part a command one cannot coher-
ently command someone to do contradictory things; if the Consti-
tution is law, all aspects of it must have singular and 
noncontradictory meanings. And since means are subordinate to 
ends, if we establish an aspect of the Constitution as a mere 
means, it must be subordinate to whatever end it serves. 
These basic points present a problem for "making sense" of 
the supremacy clause. The preamble of the Constitution seems to 
cast justice, domestic tranquility, the common welfare, etc., as the 
ends for which the Constitution itself becomes a mere set of 
means. But given the varying circumstances the nation must face 
in pursuing these ends, the Constitution's means must sometimes 
be imperfect. And if means are subordinate to ends, the means of 
the Constitution, by the Constitution's own terms, cannot reason-
ably claim to be the "supreme law of the land." Thus either the 
supremacy clause is not to be taken seriously, for its terms are 
contradicted by the apparent relation of the Constitution to its 
preamble, or alternatively, the relation must be one other than 
that of means to ends. Pursuing the latter view, the Constitution 
could be considered the concrete embodiment of the preamble's 
abstract ideals and thus an end in itself, that is, "the good society, 
or the best society of which we are capable."6 But this solution 
presents difficulties of its own, for it arrogantly assumes complete 
knowledge of what is good society, an assumption belied by the 
presence of article V's amending provision. So, having shown that 
the Constitution is neither a body of pure means nor an absolute 
end, Professor Barber sets forth the following as the basic logic of 
the Constitution's claim to authority: 
Major Premise: We the people want justice, the general wel-
fare, domestic tranquility, the common defense-in brief, the in-
gredients of the good society. 
Minor Premise: The ways of the Constitution constitute our 
best current conception of the good society-<>ur best understand-
ing for now. 
Conclusion: We therefore accept this Constitution--that is, 
we accept it as supreme law. 
Viewing the Constitution through this logic and as an end in 
5. Trying to Make Sense of the Supremacy Clause, as he titles chapter three. /d. at 
39-62. 
6. !d. at 56. 
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itself brings a couple of twists in conventional constitutional inter-
pretation. First, practices usually considered of instrumental 
value take on intrinsic worth. "Exercising the powers of govern-
ment and honoring constitutional rights can be valued as ends in 
themselves for the same reason that self-restraint, moderation, 
and autonomy are looked upon as virtues and objects of praise 
independently of their success as means to other desiderata."7 
Second, doubts about the Constitution's authority are actually 
preconditions to reaffirming the Constitution as law. That is, he 
maintains, we do not experience the Constitution as law unless we 
have some inclination to disobey it (since law presupposes an in-
clination towards disobedience). Similarly, we cannot accept the 
claim to supremacy unless we reason that the Constitution is our 
best current conception of the good society, reasoning that must 
consider the possibility that the Constitution won't measure up. A 
Constitution blindly obeyed is a Constitution unaffirmed.s 
Professor Barber calls this approach to the Constitution "as-
pirational."9 Concerning any provision of the Constitution, the 
interpreter must ask what is "the best reason" for the adoption of 
the provision "in the first place."to Thus while the framers' basic 
"concept" remains authoritative, the meaning of a provision does 
not have to conform to the specific "conceptions" or intentions 
that they had in mind.' 1 And our understanding of the Constitu-
tion can evolve as we develop better reasons for constitutional 
provisions. On the other hand, the Constitution's language and 
tradition prevent it from becoming just anything, even if the 
meanings we wish to attach would make it a superior document. 
For such changes there is the amendment process. Thus the Con-
stitution is neither wholly closed nor wholly open to "ideas of in-
dependent content and worth, like simple justice." Towards these, 
"the Constitution is and must be partially open."12 
In the light cast by this analysis Professor Barber then at-
tempts to "make sense" of the Constitution's three major aspects: 
constitutional powers, rights, and institutions. The enumeration 
of powers in the Constitution, he argues, shows both that there are 
"tasks to be performed" by the national government and, con-
versely, that there are "some things that the national government 
7. ld at 55-57. 
8. See id at 35, 50, 57, 114. 
9. ld at 10. 
10. ld at 76. 
II. In this Barber follows R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLy 134 ( 1977). S. 
BARBER, supra note 3, at 39-40, 117. 
12. ld at 11-12. See also id at 59. 
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[is] not to do."n Examining the "best reasons" for granting the 
enumerated powers, Professor Barber gives them an expansive 
reading, unqualified by any concern for the claims of states rights 
(whose bona fides he doubts), and reaffirming Justice Stone's char-
acterization of the tenth amendment as "a truism."t4 Yet, accord-
ing to Barber, there can be no praise or honor for acting upon 
reasons "that only the states, if anyone, can lawfully invoke." If, 
in enacting a law, Congress harbors an unavowed "primary pur-
pose" that only a state can claim while invoking one of its enu-
merated powers as a mere pretext, it violates the Constitution.ts 
Just as chapter four emphasizes "the negative implication of 
the enumeration of powers," chapter five emphasizes "the affirma-
tive, forward-looking implication of the Constitution's enumer-
ated rights."t6 Respecting rights is not a matter of simple 
inaction. Instead, "honoring constitutional rights" should be our 
"highest political value."t7 Holding that a true right must be a 
genuine "trump," a true "exemption from power" and hence an 
"absolute," Professor Barber maintains that, "we cannot have a 
constitutional reason for violating a constitutional right no matter 
what the sacr!fices."ts To those who say that absolutism renders 
the Constitution a suicide pact, Barber replies that dishonoring 
rights is itself a form of suicide, constituting as it does an essential 
change of the polity's character. And if our choice is defeat 
through revolution, coup d'etat, or war while honoring rights, ver-
sus a dishonorable victory, Professor Barber views defeat, from a 
constitutional perspective, as the more laudable. 
On the actual content of these rights, Professor Barber under-
standably provides only sketches. He does indicate that the first 
amendment prohibits all prior restraint "no matter what judges 
may think about the threat of irreparable harm" and "regardless 
of the cost." He argues for the application of the Bill of Rights to 
the states and contends that this application derives neither from 
the words nor the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth 
13. Id at 64. 
14. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
15. Jd at 91. Barber's reliance on "primary purpose" affronts democratic authority. 
For example, as an exercise of the commerce power, he argues, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
should be declared void. Id at 91-102. As everyone knows, its primary purpose was not 
the promotion of commerce, but the safeguarding of civil rights. But if the effect of dis-
crimination on the flow of interstate commerce is substantial, as seems to be the case, that 
should be sufficient reason for upholding the Civil Rights Act. Barber's contrary position 
implies the anomaly that if Congress did indeed honor civil rights less than a can of beans, 
the statute would be constitutional. 
16. Id at 108. 
17. Jd at 105. 
18. Jd at 140 (emphasis added). 
1985] BOOK REVIEW 265 
amendment, but rather from the logic of a document that places 
highest political value on honoring rights.t9 "Due process" rights 
he also regards as absolutes, as "real exceptions to what govern-
ment can do in pursuit of its ends." Professor Barber's under-
standing of due process goes beyond core "fair trial" conceptions 
and has substantive implications: due process of law exists only 
when there are constitutionally defensible reasons for the action-
"a reason, that is, to believe that what [the government] is doing 
serves the common good."2o Thus he criticizes the abstention of 
the contemporary Court from questions of economic liberty and 
defends its protection of personal liberty, including Roe v. Wade. 
Against the woman's liberty to procure an abortion through the 
second trimester, government can assert no constitutionally defen-
sible reason for interference. The primary motivation behind 
anti-abortion legislation, he maintains, is religious in character; 
other arguments are mere pretexts. Echoing his earlier argument 
regarding the unlawfulness of pretext, and viewing as most un-
likely plausible nonreligious opposition to abortion, he concludes 
that "for a long time to come, as far as I can see, the right to 
abortion will, or certainly should, appear to be a constitutional 
right."21 
19. /d. at 151, 153, 155. To contend, as did Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Balti-
more, that the Constitution's history, language, and structure firmly establish that the Bill 
of Rights applies only to the federal government is to engage, according to Professor Bar-
ber, in bad logic. "If constitutional rights can trump the powers of the national govern-
ment, and if national policies can defeat state policies, it seems anomalous," he reasons, "to 
conclude that state policies can defeat constitutional rights." /d. at 155. But Barber's "ref-
utation" has logical problems of its own, as we see when we take his argument to its im-
plied next step: "If constitutional rights can trump the powers of state governments, and if 
state policies can defeat an individual's policies, it would seem anomalous to conclude that 
the individual's policies can defeat constitutional rights." That is, constitutional limits 
would have to be extended to the private sphere, so that an individual could be held to 
answer in coun for alleged discrimination on the basis of race in his or her personal deci-
sions--who to marry, who to invite to dinner-<Jr for giving money to a religious establish-
ment. In shon, Barber begs the question of the relation of the Bill of Rights to the states by 
assuming that a right against one pany is a right against all. But of course not all rights if 
any have this universal character. The Bill of Rights thus can quite sensibly be understood, 
as Marshall stated, as "limitations on power . . . applicable to the government created by 
the instrument," Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 ( 1833). 
20. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 126, 128. 
21. /d. at 140. Like his argument against the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (as an exercise of the commerce power), see note 19 supra, his argument against 
abonion legislation affronts democratic authority. Assuming arguendo his constitutional 
premise, that reasons with religious roots count for nothing, it does not follow that their 
presence, even if assumed to constitute the primary reason, must fatally infect sufficient 
explanations that are not religiously based. And that sufficient explanations exist, is hard 
to deny. Since few wish to prohibit timely abonion of a pregnancy resulting from rape or 
incest, yet these offences are regarded by most as lesser crimes than murder, the slogan 
"abonion is murder" no doubt overstates the real sentiment of the nonreligious opposition. 
But on the other hand, few people, even among the most ardent advocates of the freedom 
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Turning to constitutional institutions, Professor Barber ar-
gues that "the Constitution makes no real sense from a checks and 
balances perspective."22 Checks and balances cast the Constitu-
tion as mere means, a structuring of ambition against ambition to 
prevent usurpation of power; it prevents us from seeing the sepa-
ration of powers as an end in itself, "the institutional embodiment 
of a national aspiration to rise above accident and force by gov-
erning ourselves by the claims of reason. "23 
Two more implications for constitutional institutions follow 
from his attempt to make sense of the Constitution. One is that 
the provisions of the Constitution cannot bend to prevent conflict 
amongst themselves or to accommodate pressing circumstances. 
The other concerns the role of the courts. That the Constitution 
itself cannot meet all circumstances or survive all emergencies, he 
maintains, follows from the basic concept of the Constitution as 
law and its claim to supremacy. To be supreme on its own terms, 
the Constitution depends on a reasoned affirmation; but affirma-
tion, to be reasonable, must include the possibility of rejection. 
"To believe in advance that the Constitution can be anything it 
has to be," he argues, "is to eliminate the possibility of rejecting 
it."24 That is, to preclude rejection is to preclude reasoned affir-
mation, which in tum is to preclude the possibility of a sensible 
claim to be the supreme law of the land. Thus, the possibility of 
emergencies or circumstances that make it impossible or senseless 
to follow the Constitution is necessary if we are to regard the Con-
stitution as supreme law. And, although the Constitution always 
binds officeholders and citizens to its provisions, this does not 
mean (paradoxically) that they should always follow the Constitu-
tion. As Professor Barber understands the Constitution, it "pre-
supposes more or less ideal circumstances,"2s and therefore actual 
circumstances may bring its provisions into conflict or render 
some provisions impossible to honor. When one who occupies of-
fice faces such circumstances, he acts no longer as the officeholder 
(because one who holds office must honor all duties of that office), 
to abort, regard abortion as just another form of contraception; and virtually no one could 
view without moral nausea the decision to abort in the sixth month of pregnancy for a 
frivolous reason-say to fit into a dress for a special dan;;e. Lying somewhere between 
contraception and infanticide, abortion can with good secular reason be considered wrong. 
How wrong and whether this wrong balances the hardship imposed by an unw~ted preg-
nancy presents tough questions on which reasonable people can differ-and which conse-
quently should be resolved by the legislature. 
22. /d at 185. 
23. Id at 180. 
24. Id at 191. 
25. /d at 189. 
1985] BOOK REVIEW 267 
but as one "strategically positioned" to do what he thinks best for 
the country.26 
On the role of the courts, Professor Barber develops three 
points. First, while courts have the authority and duty to exercise 
judicial review, they do not have exclusive authority to interpret 
the Constitution. Though the Constitution does have "one mean-
ing," this "does not imply one interpreter."27 Within his range of 
authority, every office holder must abide by his own interpretation 
of the Constitution. Second, while Congress, in accord with the 
Constitution can (indeed, should) refuse to cooperate with judicial 
decisions it thinks unconstitutional, it cannot define the constitu-
tional rights to be followed by the courts nor can it limit the reme-
dial authority or the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In fact, 
declaring the "exceptions" clause a constitutional "superfluity," 
Professor Barber contends that jurisdiction of the federal courts 
must be coextensive with federal authority.2s Third, the judiciary 
should not "defer" to other branches or exercise "judicial self-re-
straint." Neither the argument from democratic authority nor the 
argument from limited judicial capacity can authorize judges to 
do anything other than act upon their own best conception of 
what the Constitution means. 
II 
The basic logic of Barber's Constitution is this: "We want 
. the good society. The ways of the Constitution constitute our 
best current conception of the good society. We therefore accept 
this Constitution ... as supreme law."29 In this brief syllogism 
there are troubling ambiguities and apparent contradictions. The 
syllogism implies that "the good" is superior to "the just" as the 
basis of political authority. Suggesting the superiority of Platonic 
and Aristotelean over Kantian philosophy, this proposition may 
well be correct, but more than an assertion is necessary to estab-
lish its truth. And even if he had developed the argument to sus-
tain this proposition, it seems inconsistent with other parts of his 
theory. For example, in his insistence that the Constitution re-
26. I d. at 189-90, 20 I. 
27. Id. at 197. 
28. I d. at 209. The Constitution, as Barber understands it, has a surprising number of 
nullities and superfluities. In addition to the exceptions clause (art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2), there 
are the fugitive slave clause (prior to the passage of the thirteenth amendment) (art. IV, sec. 
2, cl. 3), the tenth amendment, the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (art. I, 
sec. 9, cl. 2), and, as a means of applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the privileges and 
immunities and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. S. BARBER, supra note 
3, at 200, 70, 193-96, and 154-59. 
29. Id. at 55-57. 
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quires inflexible adherence to fixed conceptions of rights and au-
thority, even if such adherence causes the destruction of the polity, 
Barber implies a morality of conviction rather than the morality 
of consequences more often associated with the idea of the good. 
One must wonder, too, about Barber's "typical citizen," who 
virtuously pursues the basic logic of the Constitution's claim to 
supremacy. This citizen must experience temptation to disobey 
the Constitution, for only this temptation, Barber maintains, stim-
ulates the intellect to inquire if the current conception of the Con-
stitution is the best conception. If this temptation is truly 
necessary, however, this citizen's intellect would seem subservient 
to his nonintellectual passions.Jo But Barber says his typical citi-
zen is "governed by an attitude that places the highest social or 
political value on the activity of reasoning about how one ought to 
live."3 1 
Professor Barber says, "we the people," "our best concep-
tion," and "we therefore accept." Seemingly, he refers to the col-
lective views of all United States citizens. But if he does, his logic 
approaches the tautological or its development is radically incom-
plete. Assuming he wishes his minor premise32 to be taken as a 
statement of fact or a condition of authority rather than a mere 
hypothetical in a logic puzzle, then how do we know that the peo-
ple regard the Constitution as their best current conception of the 
good society? If it is by the fact of ratification, then the statement 
is tautological: the Constitution is our best conception because 
(and only because) we have ratified it. Once ratified, the Constitu-
tion can never be disjoined from our best current conception. 
Even amendments become part of our best conception only at the 
instant of their ratification and not a moment before. To avoid 
this tautology, Professor Barber might have tried to develop some 
way by which one could understand a collective judgment on such 
matters. For example, he could have explicated Justice Cardozo's 
richly suggestive reference to the judgments "of men and women 
who the social mind would rank as intelligent and virtuous."J3 Or 
30. Id at 120. Even to posit temptation or disinclination as an aspect of virtue ap-
pears curious. To become virtuous one must initially repress temptation, but at least ac-
cording to an Aristotelean understanding of virtue, the passions and desires of the truly 
virtuous man (sophron) have become so controlled and properly habituated that he no 
longer experiences them as temptation. What Barber describes as a virtuous ?lan seems 
closer to what Aristotle regarded as a distinct and less noble species of the adm1rable souL 
the morally strong man (enkrates). This person indeed does experience powerful tempta-
tions, but is strong enough to resist them. 
31. /d. at vii (emphasis added). 
32. /d. at 57. 
33. B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF THE LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1928). 
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he could have explored the work of the second Justice Harlan or 
Alexander Bickel or the many others who have offered plausible 
ways of understanding collective rather than merely personal 
judgments. 
From the text, it is impossible to say whether Professor Bar-
ber considered these possibilities and then rejected them; but after 
his statement of the basic logic of the supremacy clause, all his 
arguments refer to the individual's best conception of the Constitu-
tion. Since Barber maintains that our best current conception of 
the Constitution will surely fall short of the ultimate criteria of 
true meaning (the best reasons for adopting it in the first place), it 
seems far from obvious why an individual should prefer his own 
imperfect conception over the collective imperfect conception. 
Assuming, as both the oath of office and Professor Barber's notion 
of political responsibility require, that legislators do strive to fol-
low the Constitution, then laws embody a collective conception 
(though perhaps not the best collective conception) of the Consti-
tution, one implying that the enacted law conforms to it. 
What problems for democratic authority are then presented 
by officeholders and citizens who still insist, as Barber's Constitu-
tion requires, upon basing their conduct only on their own best 
conception of the Constitution? For example, Professor Barber 
argues that "the judiciary has no constitutional warrant for defer-
ring to any branch." Admitting that judges should be skeptical of 
their own answers, he maintains that ')udges should be at least 
equally skeptical about the constitutionalism of others, since all 
are equally subjects of the Constitution as law." He continues: 
"It is therefore difficult to see how constitutional judges can follow 
anything less than their best conceptions of what the Constitution 
requires-in defiance of the other branches of government and 
public opinion, if need be."J4 The rhetorical device that lends 
credence to this statement is the phrase "anything less than their 
best." Of course no one wants any inferior conception to become 
authoritative, but why accept anything less than the best congres-
sional conception of the Constitution? When the legislators' best 
conception of the Constitution is incompatible with that of the ju-
diciary, though the judiciary admits that the legislators' concep-
tion is a reasonable one--one that just might be right and their 
own conception wrong-why should the judiciary's opinion pre-
vail over the legislators? If this is the proper way to frame the 
question, it is hard to resist the general force of James Bradley 
Thayer's answer: only when the court believes the legislature has 
34. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 218-19; see also id at 165. 
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made a clear mistake, should it declare the law void.3s 
Apart from the concern of democratic authority is the ques-
tion of order. What would be the practical consequence of Bar-
ber's insistence that each citizen and every officeholder has a 
constitutional obligation to follow only his or her best understand-
ing of the Constitution?36 While he is quite correct that the Court 
should have no monopoly on determining the meaning of the 
Constitution, this individualist approach threatens a paralyzing 
disorder. Consider one scenario: Congress passes a bill con-
forming to its members' best conception of the Constitution. The 
president on the basis of his best conception thinks the bill unlaw-
ful and vetoes it. Reaffirming its initial judgment, Congress passes 
it over his veto by the necessary two-thirds majority. The presi-
dent then refuses to enforce it. But the attorney general believes, 
according to his own best conception, that the bill does have the 
status of law, and he proceeds to enforce it against the express 
demand of the president. One solution would be for the president 
to dismiss the attorney general, giving the executive the last word 
on constitutional issues. Or perhaps the president would not dis-
miss the attorney general, and the law would be enforced through 
a court that agrees with the congressional best conception and ac-
cordingly convicts and sentences a defendant. Yet the warden to 
whose prison the convict has been sentenced agrees with the presi-
dential interpretation and refuses to lock the prisoner in his cell. 
The prisoner is recaptured and sentenced to another prison, but 
this prison's warden disagrees with the court on an evidentiary 
question, and following his best conception of due process, sets the 
prisoner free again. The permutations of Professor Barber's logic 
are endless, yet the consequence is clear-imbalance or disorder 
bordering on anarchy. 
III 
If Professor Barber's Constitution cannot govern in normal 
times, it might seem superfluous to ask how it can govern in times 
of crises, but its inadequacy here derives from a different source, 
so that even if the former problem were corrected the latter would 
remain. This source might be called its fabric of construction. 
Barber is persuasive, even eloquent in developing his propo-
sition that viewing constitutional problems with a commitment to 
35. Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Judicial Review, 7 HARV. L. 
REv. 129-55 (1893). I develop this argument for judicial restraint in greater detail in Re-
considering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activism, 46 JOURNAL oF Pouncs 503-19 (1984). 
36. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 198. 
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a constitutionally ideal state of affairs gives constitutional theory a 
coherence it cannot otherwise achieve, yet he goes on to under-
stand the Constitution not simply "in light of' its aspirations, but 
to be those aspirations; when these cannot be achieved, the Consti-
tution is no longer in effect. Recall that for Barber, the Constitu-
tion presupposes more or less ideal circumstances. When 
officeholders cannot enforce these provisions, they are no longer 
officeholders but people "strategically positioned"37 to exercise 
power, people who are no longer obliged by its provisions, but 
released to exercise "whatever prudential devices they can get 
away with in an effort to restore conditions requisite to following 
the Constitution, !(that is the end they seek."3s On the other hand, 
when it is conceivably possible to comply with a provision of the 
Constitution within one's range of authority, one is constitution-
ally obliged to do so regardless of the consequences, even if that 
includes the political death of the nation.39 
In these assertions-that the Constitution's obligations bind 
one regardless of the consequences and that necessity liberates one 
from the Constitution's obligations-Professor Barber reveals that 
curious combination of idealism and cynicism that often results 
from a refusal to recognize the Constitution as part of the political 
universe and to see politics as the art of the possible. Although he 
frequently quotes Abraham Lincoln, Professor Barber refuses to 
acknowledge what Alexander Bickel called "the Lincolnian ten-
sion,"40 the tension between principle and expediency within 
which all decent governments must reside. Professor Barber is 
surely correct in saying we should understand the Constitution in 
light of its aspirations. But despite his protestations to the con-
trary,4I his is a utopian document if it does not contain mecha-
nisms for mediating the tension between these aspirations and 
brute facts. 
In melding idealism with cynicism, Barber has constructed 
his constitution from a brittle fabric; it absolutely resists counter-
37. /d. at 189. 
38. Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
39. Thus Professor Barber argues that a "constitutional judiciary," id. at 199, should 
have realized from the start that the fugitive slave clause and any other constitutional rec-
ognition of slavery were "constitutional contradictions" or "mistakes," and should have re-
fused to give effect to any law attempting to enforce these provisions. Concerning the 
Constitution's aspirations, Professor Barber is no doubt correct, but the action he advo-
cates-which would have its analogue in the spheres of authority of all other constitutional 
officeholders and citizens-would surely have precipitated an early secession of the south-
em states that would have doomed the union. 
40. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 56-72 (1962). 
41. S. BARBER, JUpra note 3, at 62, 114. 
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vailing pressure-up to a point-then it simply snaps. This point 
is illustrated well by his treatment of constitutional rights. All 
true rights, he tells us, are trumps, genuine exemptions from 
power; whatever they protect, they protect absolutely. The Con-
stitution cannot even contemplate a right in conflict with another 
constitutional right or power. And if honoring a right requires 
suicide, better death than dishonor. 
We can agree that the Constitution must mandate noncon-
tradictory actions (and incidentally that some dishonors are worse 
than death), but his characterization of rights is only one of three 
courses to reach this conclusion. One course is to give the rights 
such a narrow reading that they could never conflict and it would 
always be possible to honor them. Although the Constitution 
would then always govern, such narrow rights would not meet 
Professor Barber's aspirational ideal. So Barber gives generous 
content to constitutional rights, but recognizing that they cannot 
always be honored, holds that the Constitution does not always 
govern. 
Between these choices--generous rights in a Constitution that 
governs only in ideal circumstances and niggardly rights in a Con-
stitution that governs always-there is of course a sensible middle 
course. It is possible to say that a person has a right of some defi-
nite, but not absolute strength. When the force of a justification 
falls short of the strength of the right, the right is protected; when 
the force of the government's justification exceeds the strength of 
the right, governmental authority will prevail. If one is addicted 
to the language of absolutes, one can say that a citizen has an 
absolute right to have his right counted at its full strength, not an 
absolute right to prevail. Or alternatively, if the language of rights 
if restricted to outcomes, that a citizen has claims that must be 
absolutely recognized for their full worth but no absolute rights. 
When an officeholder makes a good faith assessment of the 
competing claims of governmental authority and individual 
rights, he does no "dishonor" to the right if he decides that the 
government's is stronger. Indeed where the governmental claim is 
clearly stronger than an individual's right, an officeholder who 
"honored" the individual claim would be more deserving of ridi-
cule or anger rather than admiration. Some rights (e.g., the right 
to a fair trial), are so strong that they are virtually absolute. For 
the health of the body politic, perhaps courts should call them ab-
solute,42 since the circumstances in which governmental authority 
42. C. Black, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, 
Feb. 1961, at 3. 
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could outweigh them would likely be so extraordinary that courts 
could not even operate. In contrast, the right to advocate immi-
nent lawless action seems appropriately outweighed, as it is in 
contemporary judicial doctrine, when the advocacy "is likely to 
incite or produce such action."43 Even the weighty right to be free 
of state-imposed segregation could be counterbalanced by the 
need to quell a prison race riot-if indeed, following contempo-
rary court doctrine, the means were truly necessary to effect the 
clearly compelling end. 
Barber does not directly criticize this prudent middle course, 
seemingly because his idealism prevents him from seeing it. For 
him, a Constitution able to handle all contingencies, fit to meet 
"the various crises of human affairs,"44 would be a document of 
infinite flexibility, thus of infinite meaning, therefore devoid of 
meaning. "[A] plastic constitution cannot be a real constitu-
tion."4s Upon this understanding of what a constitution must be, 
Professor Barber expresses what would otherwise seem a perverse 
sense of vindication in noting constitutional failures; to him fail-
ures are necessary to affirm the Constitution's meaning.46 
But Barber confuses a flexible Constitution with a fluid one. 
The fluid Constitution is his plastic Constitution. Like Heracli-
tus's river it is always in flux, once one thing, now another, soon to 
be yet another. A flexible Constitution, on the contrary, is con-
stant in meaning but its meaning allows for adaptation to chang-
ing circumstances. It establishes ideals, but does not require ideal 
conditions for the exercise of its authority. Even in the worst of 
emergencies when its literal terms must be violated to allow its 
spirit to prevail, its authority remains a gravitational force, guid-
ing the emergency powers back to the norm as circumstances per-
mit. It does not tum officeholders loose in difficult times to do 
whatever they think is right, at liberty to return to constitutional 
norms "if that is the end they seek."47 
Barber's excessive idealism, and hence the brittleness of his 
Constitution, derives not simply from an absolutist concept of 
rights. Nor does it rest in fatuous sentimentality-indeed, if any-
thing, Barber is exceptionally rigorous in pursuing the logic of his 
argument even if this places him occasionally in the camp of his 
adversaries. Rather, its deep source is the tragically flawed desire 
to unite the concerns of philosophy and politics. Barber describes 
43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
44. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819). 
45. S. BARBER, supra note 3, at 191. 
46. /d. at 50, 60, 151, and 191. 
47. /d. at 201. 
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the highest value of his ideal citizen both as the distinctively polit-
ical value, "honor," and the distinctively philosophical value, 
"reason." He wishes love of truth to be identical to the love of 
country. His book is written from the perspective of a citizen, but 
that citizen must be a philosopher. Barber's citizens are to be 
taught that "favoritism of anything other than the truth [is] im-
moral" and that they must hold "truth above all other values."4s 
Can the Constitution truly share so singularly the philoso-
pher's end of truth? Perhaps it would be possible for politics to 
hold truth and its pursuit above all other values, (politics con-
cerned only disembodied souls. But politics generally, and espe-
cially the politics of liberal democracies, is concerned as well with 
the needs and desires of the body; and consequently politics must 
be concerned not simply with the hierarchy of ends but also with 
their urgency. Thus even if we hold with Barber that truth should 
be the highest pursuit of man, a polity must sometimes yield in-
stead to demands for privacy and physical security and well-
being. 
For Barber, the Constitution's authority depends on its fidel-
ity to the standard of truth. Under his basic logic, one can affirm 
the Constitution's claim to authority only following a critical and 
reasoned assessment that the Constitution matches one's best con-
ception of the best society; as one's knowledge grows, one must 
continually subject the Constitution to this test to affirm its 
supremacy.49 Given Barber's unyielding philosophical standard, 
affirmation would seem a rare event; nothing less than the best 
merits allegiance. Deeply concerned with the conditions of this 
affirmation, Barber curiously neglects the consequences of rejec-
tion. One of these consequences, of course, is that with no affir-
mation of the Constitution, obedience to laws passed under its 
authority becomes a matter of expediency rather than general ob-
ligation. It is most unlikely that in such conditions one could 
comfortably contemplate "how one ought to live."so In short, if 
the life of the mind is to prevail or even survive, it cannot reign 
sublimely oblivious to politics. The true philosopher should thus 
affirm the general authority of the decent regime that assists, with-
48. Id at 162-63. His position on prior restraint follows logically from this; as long as 
it is plausible that one publishes for the purpose of "influencing public policy . . . there can 
be no constitutional prior restraint, no matter what judges may think about the threat of 
irreparable harm." Id at 151. Barber confesses that his position will render the Constitu-
tion a suicide-pact; but this, he indicates, is nonetheless the requirement of a document 
resting its authority on the independent affirmation of citizens who examine all relevant 
knowledge. ld at 151. 
49. ld at 160. 
50. ld at vii. 
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out completing, his development and tolerates, without necessarily 
following, his teaching. 
Inappropriate for politics, inexpedient as a measure of obliga-
tion, the singular concern of the philosopher as the end of consti-
tutional authority is in a very basic sense unnatural. Consider his 
attempt to remold the concept of "Founding Fathers." The ideal 
or true father, he indicates, is the one "who knows what is best."si 
The meaning of this idea of fatherhood, which superficially hints 
of paternalism, Barber unfolds with relished irony as teaching that 
children must think for themselves--otherwise they will not know 
who their "true" father is. In seeking guidance, children should 
regard their natural parents indifferently among the millions from 
whom advice might be obtained; each potential "father" will be 
judged according to the child's capacity to decide who truly knows 
best. As her own thinking changes, the child will become attached 
first to one person then to another. Similarly, by implication, the 
true Founding Fathers are not those responsible for writing the 
Constitution, but the great teachers of mandkind: Moses, Plato, 
Aristotle, Christ, Hobbes, as well as those whose relation to the 
actual founders is remote, such as Confucious, Buddha, and 
Mohammed.s2 
In retaliation for teaching exactly this sort of subversive dis-
tance from one's own father and fatherland, the Socrates of Aris-
tophanes' Clouds was made to suffer the burning of his home by 
an enraged parent and on such a charge the real Socrates was 
made to drink the hemlock. For one as well educated in classical 
philosophy as Professor Barber, it is curious that he appears to 
take Plato's reply to these charges in the Republic as earnest rather 
than ironic:s3 recall that as a condition to the Republics perfect 
union of philosophy and politics, parents (who do not share the 
philosopher's passion for wisdom) must force the philosophers 
(who would rather reason rather than rule) to become kings and 
then abandon to them their children, land, and country. TheRe-
public thus defends the enterprise of philosophy by portraying its 
perfect regime of philosopher Kings with supreme Socratic irony, 
51. /d. at 119. 
52. Or perhaps Mick Jaggor and Michael Jackson, since the individual decides for 
himself who is a great thinker. It should be emphasized that the question here is not 
whether the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the teachings of the compassion-
ate Buddha; Barber is clear that towards such teachings the Constitution can at most be 
only marginally open. Rather the question for one embracing Buddhism is whether in 
light of its teaching the authority of the Constitution can be affirmed as the best embodi-
ment of a Buddhist society. (Indeed, it is far from clear that many Christians could give a 
similar affirmation.) 
53. See, e.g., id. at 135-37. 
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by showing the very impossibility of a perfect regime, philosophy 
demonstrates the defensibility of imperfect but decent regimes. 
Barber seems oddly to take this ironic defense of philosophy, 
the construction of a deliberately unnatural and impossible re-
gime, as his standard of evaluation and of allegiance. In doing so 
his argument corrupts the spheres of both politics and philosophy. 
As Aristophanes correctly taught, perfect indifference to one's 
own family and fatherland in the name of impartial and perfect 
justice destroys the loyalty that makes civilized life and pro tanto 
actual justice possible. By the same token, in pretending that the 
pursuit of truth heedless of personal interest-the extraordinarily 
rare and precious gift for philosophy--<::an be the common lot of 
typical citizens, Barber debases its high and noble character, a 
character that presupposes and yet transcends politics. 
These are serious criticisms, but then Barber has written an 
eminently serious book, one that ties constitutional analysis to the 
most basic questions of western civilization. If there are faults in 
the analysis, as I maintain there are, one can still say that there is 
sometimes more to learn from the errors of great efforts than from 
the truths of petty ones. 
